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SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDS CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW,
RULING THE LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION ON CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)
I. FACTS
Gary Ewing, a four-time felon on parole, walked into the pro shop of
the El Segundo Golf Course with the intent to commit another crime.' He
walked out of the shop with three golf clubs, priced at $399 each, concealed
in the leg of his pants.2 Realizing that Ewing looked "totally out of place,"
an employee telephoned the police, and he was arrested in the parking lot.3
Ewing was convicted of grand theft.4 Since Ewing had committed four
prior violent felonies, he was sentenced to twenty-five years to life under
California's three strikes law.5
1. Ewing v. California, No. 143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. Ewing entered the shop, looked at the golf clubs, and purchased a small bucket of balls
for use on the driving range. Id. He then asked for directions to the driving range and walked
back to the golf clubs. Id. After looking at the golf clubs, the employee noticed Ewing limping as
he proceeded to the parking lot instead of the driving range. Id. When the police arrived, the offi-
cer observed Ewing walking "stiff legged" between two parked cars. Id. He then observed Ewing
pull three golf clubs out of his pants and arrested him. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. California's three strikes legislation states:
If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions... that have been pled and
proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of
life imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as
the greater of: (i) three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each
current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions, (ii)
imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years, (iii) the term determined by the court
pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancement
applicable under Chapter 4.5 ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999). Under Section 1170.12, California's three strikes
law is codified a second time in almost identical language, as it states,
If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions ... that have been pled and
proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of
life imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as
the greater of: (i) three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each
current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions, or
(ii) twenty-five years, or (iii) the term determined by the court pursuant to Section
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Ewing had several prior criminal convictions.6 His criminal career
began in 1984 when he was convicted of grand theft.7 Later, between 1988
and 1993, he was convicted of eight misdemeanors. 8 These convictions
resulted in several periods of incarceration and probation. 9 In 1993, over a
five-week period, he committed three burglaries and one robbery in a Long
Beach apartment complex.10 Ewing was convicted and sentenced to nine
years and eight months in prison, then paroled in 1999.11 Ten months later,
in 2000, he stole the golf clubs from the pro shop.12 The jury found Ewing
guilty of felony grand theft. 13
At sentencing, the Defendant asked the court to reduce the grand theft
conviction to a misdemeanor and to strike "an appropriate number" of his
prior convictions to avoid a three strikes sentence. 14 The Defendant's
counsel urged the court to give leniency during sentencing due to the
1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under
Chapter 4.5 ....
Id. § 1 170.12(c)(2)(A).
6. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18-19 (2003).
7. Id. at 18. Ewing was twenty-two when he pled guilty to grand theft. Id. The court sen-
tenced Ewing to six months in jail, three years probation, and a three hundred dollar fine. Id.
8. Id. In 1988, Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft auto, but the sentencing court
reduced the crime to a misdemeanor after Ewing served a one-year sentence and completed
probation. Id. at 19. In 1990, he was convicted of petty theft and sentenced to sixty days in jail
and probation. Id. In 1992, he was convicted of battery and sentenced to thirty days in jail and
probation. Id. Later in 1992, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to ten days in jail and pro-
bation. Id. In January 1993, Ewing was convicted of burglary and sentenced to sixty days in jail
and probation. Id. In February 1993, he was convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia and sen-
tenced to six months in jail and probation. Id. In July 1993, he was convicted of appropriating
lost property and sentenced to ten days in jail and probation. Id. In September 1993, he was con-
victed of unlawfully possessing a firearm and trespassing and sentenced to thirty days in jail and
probation. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. One of the burglary victims was awakened by Ewing attempting to take her video-
cassette recorder and television. Id. Ewing ran out the front door after hearing the victim scream.
Id. On another occasion, Ewing confronted a victim in the mailroom of the apartment complex.
Id. Ewing claimed to have a gun and ordered the victim to hand over his wallet. Id. When the
victim resisted, Ewing brandished a knife and forced the victim back to the victim's apartment.
Id. As Ewing rummaged through the victim's apartment, the victim fled. Id. Ewing escaped with
the victim's money and credit cards. Id.
11. Id. Even though Ewing had committed four violent felonies in 1993, he was not sen-
tenced under the three strikes law because the law had not come into existence until 1994. See
People v. Superior Court of San Diego County ex rel. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996)
(discussing the background of California's three strikes law while holding that the trial court has
the discretion to strike a previous felony in cases arising under the three strikes law); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(b) (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2004).
12. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19 (2003).
13. Ewing v. California, No. 143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25,
2001). The state had charged Ewing with one count of felony burglary and one count of felony




Defendant's age and poor health.15 The trial judge took into consideration
the Defendant's entire criminal history and the fact that he was on parole
when he committed his last offense.16 The judge decided the grand theft
would remain a felony and the Defendant's four prior strikes would stand.17
Under California's three strikes law, Ewing was a felon with two or more
"serious or violent" felonies and was sentenced to twenty-five years to life
for stealing $1,200 worth of merchandise.18
15. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (No.
01-6978) (requesting leniency due to Ewing's age, he was thirty-eight at the time of sentencing,
and his deteriorating physical health due to AIDS).
16. Ewing, 2001 WL 1840666, at *3.
17. Id. at I. The trial court did not make an express ruling on the motion to reduce Ewing's
felony to a misdemeanor. Id. at **1-2. However, the appellate court implied a denial when the
trial court declined to strike his prior convictions. Id. at *2.
18. Id. at *L. California's three strikes law has defined serious felonies as offenses listed in
section 1192.7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West 1999). Section 1192.7 lists serious felonies
as:
(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force,
violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (5) oral copulation by force,
violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (6) lewd or lascivious act on a
child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in
the state prison for life; (8) any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great
bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the
defendant personally uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder; (10) assault with intent to
commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace
officer; (12) assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly
weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive
with intent to injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing
bodily injury, great bodily injury, or mayhem; (17) exploding a destructive device or
any explosive with intent to murder; (18) any burglary of the first degree; (19) robbery
or bank robbery; (20) kidnapping; (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in a
state prison; (22) attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in
the state prison for life; (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a
dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling, furnishing, administering, giving, or
offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor any heroin, cocaine, phen-
cyclidine (PCP), or any methamphetamine-related drug, as described in paragraph (2)
of subdivision (d) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code, or any of the
precursors of methamphetamines, as described in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of
subdivision (f) of Section 11055 or subdivision (a) of Section 11100 of the Health and
Safety Code; (25) any violation of subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is
accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (26) grand theft
involving a firearm; (27) carjacking; (28) any felony offense, which would also
constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22; (29) assault with the intent to commit
mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral copulation, in violation of Section 220; (30) throwing
acid or flammable substances, in violation of Section 244; (3 1) assault with a deadly
weapon, firearm, machine gun, assault weapon, or semiautomatic firearm or assault on
a peace officer or firefighter, in violation of Section 245; (32) assault with a deadly
weapon against a public transit employee, custodial officer, or school employee, in
violation of Sections 245.2, 245.3, or 245.5; (33) discharge of a firearm at an inhabited
dwelling, vehicle, or aircraft, in violation of Section 246; (34) commission of rape or
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Ewing appealed the trial court's decision, arguing his sentence violated
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.19
Ewing argued that his property crime was one of the least serious on the
spectrum of criminal behaviors.20 However, the sentence he received was
one of the most severe that California courts were authorized to impose.
2 1
Ewing argued that a comparison of his crime in relation to his sentence
raised an inference of "gross disproportionality."
22
The California Court of Appeals rejected Ewing's arguments and
affirmed the trial court's decision, relying on Rummel v. Estelle
23 to
determine that his sentence was not "grossly disproportionate" under the
Eighth Amendment.2 4  The court found that Ewing's sentence served the
sexual penetration in concert with another person, in violation of Section 264. 1; (35)
continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5; (36) shooting from a
vehicle, in violation of subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 12034; (37) intimidation of
victims or witnesses, in violation of Section 136.1; (38) criminal threats, in violation
of Section 422; (39) any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than
an assault; (40) any violation of Section 12022.53; (41) a violation of subdivision (b)
or (c) of Section 11418; and (42) any conspiracy to commit an offense described in
this subdivision.
Id. at § 1192.7. Violent felonies are defined as offenses listed in section 667.5 of the penal code.
Id. There are fewer violent felonies listed in comparison to serious felonies; however, the list of
violent felonies have been included in the list of serious felonies under section 1192.7 of the penal
code. Id. at § 667.5(c). The code states that "[t]he Legislature finds and declares that these
specified crimes merit special consideration when imposing a sentence to display society's
condemnation for these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person." Id.
19. Ewing, 2001 WL 1840666, at *1. The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution states that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978). Under
California law, grand theft without any prior convictions authorizes a court to sentence an
offender to a maximum of sixteen months. Id. at 8. Absent application of the three strikes law,
grand theft with prior convictions carries a maximum sentence of three years. Id. at 8-9. Ewing
argued that California's sentencing guidelines illustrates that grand theft is among the least
significant in the spectrum of criminal conduct. Id. at 7.
21. Id. There are only two sentences that are more severe, death and life without parole,
which are reserved for those who commit the most violent crimes. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 20-21. Ewing argued that a finding of "gross disproportionality" is further con-
firmed when considering the sentences imposed in California and in other jurisdictions for the
same offense. Id. at 10- 11.
23. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
24. Ewing, 2001 WL 1840666, at *L. The appellate court observed that the United States
Supreme Court has rejected the contention that recidivism statutes are cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at *4. The appellate court noted from Rummel that a recidivist sentence is
"'based not merely on that person's most recent offense but also on the propensities he has
demonstrated over a period of time during which he has been convicted of and sentenced for other
crimes."' Id. (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284). Since the sentence in Rummel did not violate
the Eighth Amendment, by analogy the appellate court determined that Ewing's sentence did not
violate the Eight Amendment. Id. Ewing's recidivism justified his twenty-five year sentence. Id.
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legitimate goals of deterring and incapacitating repeat offenders.25 The
California Supreme Court denied Ewing's petition for review. 26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.27 The issue be-
fore the Court was whether California's three strikes legislation violated the
Eighth Amendment by sentencing repeat felons to a prison term of twenty-
five years to life.28 The Court held that California's three strikes law does
not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments. 29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution limits punishments on an offender
through the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ments. 30 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." 31 This amendment applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 32
25. Id. at *4. The appellate court recognized that California courts have upheld numerous
severe sentences under the three strikes law for minor offenses committed after two or three prior
strike convictions. Id. The court noted that under California's Constitution, a sentence is dispro-
portionate only if it "'shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity."'
Id. (quoting In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921,930 (Cal. 1972)). The court applied three factors: "(1) the
nature of the offense and offender, (2) the sentence compared to sentences for more serious
offenses in California, and (3) the sentence compared to sentences for the same offenses in other
states." Id. (citing Lynch, 503 P.2d at 930-32). The court determined that Ewing's sentence was
reasonably proportional to the offense and offender due to Ewing's recidivist history and the
severity of Ewing's prior convictions. Id. The court also determined that Ewing's sentence con-
formed to other repeat offender sentences within California and in other states. Id. Therefore, the
court concluded Ewing's sentence did not violate California's Constitution. Id.
26. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
27. Ewing v. California, 535 U.S. 969 (2002), aff'd 538 U.S. 11 (2003). The Court also
granted certiorari in Lockyer v. Andrade, an appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). In Lockyer, the issue before the Court was whether
Andrade's two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life in prison for a third strike was an
unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court law. Id. at 66. The Court held, on
habeas review, that state court's affirmance of consecutive twenty-five years to life sentence for
petty theft under California's three strikes law was not an unreasonable application of federal law.
Id. at 77.
28. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14.
29. Id. at 30-31.
30. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
31. Id.
32. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying the Eighth Amendment
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive.., any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend XIV. The defendant in Robinson had violated a California statute that stated the following:
"No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics... [any person convicted of violating any provision of this section is guilty
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A. PURPOSES OF THREE STRIKES LEGISLATION
The overall purpose of punishment within the criminal justice system is
to prevent the commission of crimes and to deter recidivism. 33 In order for
that objective to be successful, punishment must be effective in addressing
the problems and solutions for the entire system, not just in individual
cases.34 There are many methods available to reduce crime, such as addi-
tional police, additional courts, mandatory sentencing, and increased
prosecutorial resources. 35
Federal courts defer to state legislatures when enacting and imple-
menting crime reduction methods. 36 California decided the most efficient
way to reduce crime was through sentencing. 37 The legislation targeted
career criminals.38 To make punishment more effective and increase public
safety, California passed the three strikes law. 39 The traditional penological
theories of punishment serve four purposes: deterrence, incapacitation,
retribution, and rehabilitation.4o
of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor
more than one year in the county jail."
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661. The court determined that a statute that makes the "status" of narcotic
addiction a criminal offense inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 666-67.
33. James A. Ardaiz, Essay: California's Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations,
Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3 (2000). Recidivism is "[a] tendency to relapse into a
habit of criminal activity or behavior." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed. 1999).
34. Ardaiz, supra note 33, at 3.
35. Id.
36. See In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 129 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting petitioner's argument that
the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment).
37. Ardaiz, supra note 33, at 3.
38. See People v. Leng, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing the trial
court's decision to use juvenile's non-serious and non-violent crime as a second strike under the
three strikes law).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (b)-(i) (West 1999). Section 667 reads in part, "It is the intent
of the Legislature ... to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who
commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses."
Id. § 667(b). California's three strikes law stated:
If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions.., that have been pled and
proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of
life imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as
the greater of: (i) three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each
current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions, (ii)
imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years, (iii) The term determined by the court
pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancement
applicable under Chapter 4.5 ....
Id. § 667 (e)(2)(A).
40. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(upholding defendant's mandatory life sentence for possessing cocaine).
[VOL. 80:497
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Deterrence is punishment given to dissuade other potential offenders.41
The three strikes law seeks to use mandatory increased sentences to deter
habitual offenders. 42 In developing legislation to reduce crime, California
focused on offenders who have previously committed serious or violent
felonies but have not been deterred from further criminality by their prior
imprisonment.
43
Incapacitation is the most direct means of preventing future offenses by
either imprisoning or executing the offender.44 The theory's primary pur-
pose is to protect the public by incarcerating offenders and keeping them off
the streets.45 California's intent in passing the three strikes law was to en-
sure longer prison sentences by incapacitating the offender. 46 The length of
time an offender should remain incapacitated is based on the offender's
most recent offense and the offender's criminal tendencies.
47
Retribution focuses on punishing an offender, rather than preventing a
crime from occurring. 48 Three strikes laws serve the retributive purpose be-
cause a repeat offender is more blameworthy due to repeated commission of
crime and should serve harsher punishments.
4 9
41. See People v. Juarez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 697, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding
defendant's five year felony sentence enhancement under § 667 of the California Penal Code).
There are two types of deterrence: general and specific. Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The Un-
principled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California's Habitual Criminal Statute,
43 STAN. L. REV. 193, 210-13 (1990). Under a general deterrence theory, the threat of incar-
ceration prevents individuals from engaging in criminal conduct. Id. Specific deterrence is
punishment given to dissuade a specific group of offenders, such as recidivists in the three strikes
legislation. Id.
42. Leng, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
43. Id.
44. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (upholding defendant's mandatory
life sentence for a third felony under Texas' recidivist statute); Dubber, supra note 41, at 216.
45. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85.
46. Leng, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
47. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85.
48. See People v. Kilborn, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding
defendant's sentence for a third felony under California's three strikes law); Dubber, supra note
41, at 202.
49. Kilborn, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154. However, it is argued that the three strikes law violates
the retributive principles of uniformity and proportionality. Dubber, supra note 41, at 208. The
law does not balance the seriousness of the violation or the offender's blameworthiness in de-
termining the sentence. Id. Instead, the punishment is a mandatory sentence based on the cate-
gory of the crime. Id. The law does not take into consideration specific characteristics of the
offender that would result in either mitigation or elevation of an offender's blameworthiness. Id.
Ignoring these characteristics would violate the foundations of criminal punishment as set forth by
the California Supreme Court. Id. at 209. "'The ethical principles that punishment should be pro-
portionate to individual guilt, and that a less culpable offender should not be punished more
severely than a more culpable offender, permeate the criminal law and underlie constitutional
protections."' Id. (quoting Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 864 (Cal. 1983), overruled in
part on other grounds by People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987) (holding that intent to
kill was not an element of the felony murder special circumstance)).
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Rehabilitation focuses on reforming an offender by encouraging be-
havior that conforms to society.50 Rehabilitation focuses on treatment and
social rehabilitation for the offender instead of punishment.5 ' It is generally
not effective with repeat offenders, which is evident through the offender's
continued criminal behavior. 52 California, like most states, has replaced or
supplemented rehabilitation with retribution for their sentencing schemes. 53
Adopting the three strikes law illustrated California's abandonment of the
rehabilitative theory in criminal sentencing.S4 Commonly, a rehabilitative
sentencing system consists of an indeterminate sentence that can be short-
ened if the offender has been rehabilitated.55 This individualized sentence
provides an incentive to the offender to reform. 56 This aspect is absent in
the three strikes law.57 Instead, the law creates a determinate sentence that
does not allow consideration of a specific offender's rehabilitative
potential. 58
B. CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW
California's criminal justice system has shifted toward punishing repeat
offenders. 59 California had previously maintained the rehabilitation theory
for criminal sentencing for sixty years. 60  However, in 1976, the
Determinate Sentencing Law was introduced, requiring offenders to serve
50. See People v. Caddick, 206 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the trial
court's calculation of the defendant's work credit toward his prison sentence).
51. Id.
52. Id.; Ardaiz, supra note 33, at 5.
53. Caddick, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1972)). An indeterminate sentence is "a
sentence of an unspecified duration, such as one for a term of ten to twenty years." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1367 (7th ed. 1999).
56. Caddick, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (citing Lynch, 503 P.2d at 924).
57. Id.
58. Id. A determinate sentence is "a sentence for a fixed length of time rather than for an
unspecified duration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1367 (7th ed. 1999).
59. Caddick, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
60. Id. The California Legislature has outlined the purpose of the Determinate Sentencing
Law as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is
punishment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the
same offense under similar circumstances. The Legislature further finds and declares
that the elimination of disparity and the provision of uniformity of sentences can best
be achieved by determinate sentences fixed by statute in proportion to the seriousness
of the offense as determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the court with
specified discretion.
CAL. PENAL CODE § I 170(a)(l) (West 1999).
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longer sentences. 61 The law was passed in order to ensure proportionate
and uniform sentencing. 62 The passage of the law "reversed the purpose of
sentencing in California from rehabilitation to punishment .... "63
In 1994, California enacted the three strikes law.64 There are two ver-
sions of California's three strikes law. 65 First, California Penal Code
section 667, also known as Initiative 593, was enacted by the Legislature.
66
At the general election, California voters approved the second version,
Proposition 184, California Penal Code section 1170.12.67 The two statutes
are virtually identical and operate in the same manner by increasing prison
terms for repeat offenders.68 Two murders committed in California roused
the support of Proposition 184.69 Both of the victims' fathers became
public advocates for the three strikes law in California.
70
California's three strikes law states that if the defendant has one prior
"serious or violent" felony conviction, as defined in the penal code,71 the
sentence is "twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the
current felony conviction."7 2 If the defendant has two or more prior
61. Caddick, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 457. The Determinate Sentencing Law states,
In any case in which the punishment prescribed by statute for a person convicted of a
public offense is a term of imprisonment in the state prison of any specification of
three time periods, the court shall sentence the defendant to one of the terms of
imprisonment specified ... In sentencing the convicted person, the court shall apply
the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § I 170(a)(3) (West 2004).
62. See People v. Simon, 193 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding defendant's
prison sentence for forgery).
63. Caddick, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
64. See People v. Superior Court of San Diego County ex rel. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630
(Cal. 1996) (holding the trial court has the discretion to strike a previous felony in cases arising
under the three strikes law); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1170.12 (West 2004).
65. Romero, 917 P.2d at 630.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 630-31.
68. Id. at 631.
69. See State v. Oliver, 745 A.2d 1165, 1167 (N.J. 2000) (discussing the origins of three
strikes legislation while holding New Jersey's three strikes law constitutional). In 1992, eighteen-
year-old Kimber Reynolds had been murdered by a repeat offender in Fresno, California. Id. In
1993, Richard Allen Davis kidnapped twelve-year-old Polly Klaas from her home in Petaluma,
California. Id. After kidnapping Polly, Davis raped and killed her. Id. Davis was a six-time of-
fender who was on parole for his recent offense of sexual assault when he murdered Polly. Id.
70. Id. The fathers of Kimber Reynolds and Polly Klaas became involved in preventing the
premature release of dangerous criminals from prison. Id. They focused primarily on California's
three strikes law. Id.
71. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 1999) (listing all "serious" felonies); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West 1999) (listing all "violent" felonies).
72. Id. § 667(e)(1); id. § 1170.12(c)(1).
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"serious or violent" felony convictions, the sentence is "an indeterminate
term of life imprisonment."73
Certain offenses under California law can be classified as either
misdemeanors or felonies.74 These offenses are known as "wobblers."75 If
the offense is treated as a felony, the offense is a triggering offense under
the three strikes law. 76 Once an offense is treated as a felony, only the
discretion of the prosecutor or the court can lower the offense to a
misdemeanor.77 The court will consider various factors in determining
whether to treat the offense as a misdemeanor or felony.78 Those factors
include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offenses, (2) the defendant's
appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, and (3) the general
objective of sentencing. 79 Besides reducing "wobblers" to misdemeanors,
another way to avoid a three strikes sentence is by vacating allegations of
prior "serious or violent" felony convictions. 80
73. Id. § 667(e)(2)(a); id. § I 170.12(c)(2)(a).
74. See People v. Superior Court ex rel. Alvarez, 928 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Cal. 1997) (holding
the trial courts have the discretion to reduce "wobbler" offenses by granting probation or imposing
a sentence other than prison). Section 17 of the California Penal Code states,
Iw]hen a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the
state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all
purposes under the following circumstances: (1) After a judgment imposing a
punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison ... (3) When the court grants
probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting
probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court
declares the offense to be a misdemeanor ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 1999).
75. Alvarez, 928 P.2d at 1174. In Alvarez, the trial court reduced a charge of possession of
controlled sentence from a felony to a misdemeanor. Id. at 973-74. The defendant was in pos-
session of drug paraphernalia and a baggie of .41 grams of methamphetamine, a felony violation
of the Health and Safety Code. Id. at 973. In another California case, the court elevated a charge
of petty theft from a misdemeanor to a felony. People v. Bury, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 683 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996). Due to the defendant's three prior convictions of "serious and violent" felonies, the
court elevated the petty theft to a felony. Id. The felony conviction triggered the three strikes law
and the defendant was sentenced to twenty-eight years to life. Id.
76. Alvarez, 928 P.2d at 1178. The crime remains a felony unless the trial court exercises its
discretion in reducing the crime to a misdemeanor. See People v. Williams, 163 P.2d 692, 696
(1945) (affirming the trial court's decision to admit evidence of defendant's previous felony
conviction).
77. Alvarez, 928 P.2d at 1176.
78. Id. at 1177.
79. Id.
80. Williams, 948 P.2d at 437. In determining whether to vacate allegations of prior felony
convictions, the court in question must consider,
[W]hether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in
whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. If it is striking or vacating an
allegation or finding, it must set forth its reasons in an order entered on the minutes,
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C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THREE STRIKES LAWS
The Supreme Court has already determined that no sentence is consti-
tutional per se.81 The Eighth Amendment specifically prohibits excessive
bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. 82 However, the
Court has not clearly stated what the Eighth Amendment actually pro-
hibits.83 There is some debate whether the Eighth Amendment only applies
to cruel and unusual modes of punishment and not to disproportional
sentences. 84 Members of the Court have disagreed whether the Eighth
Amendment contains a proportionality principle. 85 If it is agreed that the
Eighth Amendment does contain a proportionality principle, the next step
for the Court is to set forth a framework to determine if an offender's
sentence violates that principle.
86
1. Proportionality Implied in the Eighth Amendment
The principle of proportionality in sentencing was founded in English
law.87 The idea dates back to the Magna Carta of 1215, which stated, "a
free man shall not be [fined] for a trivial offence, except in accordance with
the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be [fined]
according to its gravity." 88 When drafting the United States Constitution,
and if it is reviewing the striking or vacating of such allegation or finding, it must pass
on the reasons so set forth.
Id.
81. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The Court held a ninety-day sentence
for narcotics addiction unconstitutional. Id. at 666. The Court noted that a sentence of one day in
prison could be unconstitutional under certain circumstances. Id. at 667. However, in another
case, the Court concluded that three strikes laws do not violate the constitutional prohibition of
double jeopardy. See Grygor v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (upholding a defendant's life
sentence under Pennsylvania's Habitual Criminal Act). The court reasoned that the offender's
sentence is not viewed as a new jeopardy or additional penalty for earlier crimes; rather, the
sentence is stiffened due to the repetitive nature of the offenses. Id.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
83. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 985; Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983). The California Supreme Court has
determined that under California's Constitution, a sentence is disproportionate only if it "shocks
the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921,
930 (Cal. 1972). The court applied a framework with three factors: (1) the nature of the offense
and offender, (2) the sentence compared to sentences for more serious offenses in California, and
(3) the sentence compared to sentences for the same offenses in other states. Id. at 930-32.
87. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011 n.l (White, J., dissenting); Solem, 463 U.S. at 284; Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288-89 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
88. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288-89 (quoting JAMES CLARKE HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965)).
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the framers adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights and the
Eng'ish principle of proportionality. 89
The majority of precedent has applied a proportionality principle to the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments for
over a century. 9O The Court has ruled that the only sentences that will vio-
late this provision will be those sentences that are "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the crime committed. 91 Because courts will only consider
"grossly disproportionate" sentences unconstitutional, successful constitu-
tional challenges will be exceedingly rare in non-capital cases.92
The most recent line of cases considering the constitutionality of an
offender's sentence began with Rummel.93 In Rummel, the defendant was
sentenced to life in prison under a Texas recidivist statute.94 Rummel's
previous offenses had consisted of two felonies, fraudulent use of a credit
card, and passing a forged check.95 His third felony conviction consisted of
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, for which the trial court imposed a
life sentence. 96 Rummel appealed his sentence, stating it was cruel and
unusual punishment since the life sentence was so disproportionate to the
crimes he had committed. 97 The Court held that Rummel's mandatory
sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. 98
89. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86. The English Bill of Rights contained a proportionality prin-
ciple, which stated, "excessive [b]aile ought not to be required nor excessive [flines imposed nor
cruel and unusual [plunishments inflicted." Id. at 285 (quoting 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689)).
Also, common-law punishments were required to be proportional to the offense under the chapters
of Magna Carta. Id. (citing Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 1615)).
90. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1910) (holding a prisoner's
punishment improper because it was not proportionate to his offense; therefore, the prisoner's
sentence violated the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
91. Id.
92. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. A capital sentence is reviewed more closely because "it is
unique in its total irrevocability." Id. Previous decisions in capital cases offer limited assistance
due to the unique nature of the death penalty. Id.
93. Id. at 264.
94. Id. Texas passed a recidivist statute in 1973, stating that offenders that "'have been three
times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life
in the penitentiary."' Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974)).
95. Id. at 265-66.
96. Id. at 266.
97. Id. at 267. The-Texas state court imposed Rummel's life sentence. Id. at 266. Rummel
appealed and the Texas appellate courts rejected his appeal. Id. at 267. Rummel sought a writ of
habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Id. The Fifth Circuit's District Court and Court of
Appeals rejected Rummel's argument. Id. at 267-268. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Id. at 265.
98. Id. at 285.
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In deciding Rummel, the Court deferred to the state legislature to de-
cide what societal interests were involved in sentencing offenders.99 The
Court held that it was up to the state to decide whether Rummel was
capable of conforming to the norms of society.100
The Court took into consideration Rummel's sentence triggering
conduct and his criminal history when it determined the proportionality of
his sentence.' 0 ' Another important factor for the Court was that Rummel's
sentence was a non-capital sentence.102 Rummel was sentenced to life, but
was eligible for parole after twelve years.103 A capital senterce is reviewed
more closely because "'it is unique in its total irrevocability." 04 Capital
sentences completely reject rehabilitation as a purpose for punishment.
05
Therefore, with the exception of capital punishment, successful constitu-
tional challenges to the proportionality of sentences are very rare.1
06
However, the Court had not set forth ubjective factors to determine the
proportionality of a particular sentence.107 Nor had the Court diszussed
how narrowly or broadly the Eighth Amendment's implied proportionality
principle should be interpreted. 1
08
a. Framework for Determining Proportionality
In Solem v. Helm,109 the Court created an objective framework to
determine if an offender's sentence was proportional." 0 The first step is to
weigh the gravity of the offense with the severity of the punishment."' In
weighing the crime with the punishment, several factors can be used, such
as harm caused to victim or society, the culpability of the offender, length
of prison term, triggering conduct, and the offender's criminal history." 2
Second, courts can perform an intra-jurisdictional comparison."l 3 Third,
99. Id. at 274.
100. Id. at 276.
101. Id. at 276, 278.
102. Id. at 280.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 272 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983).
108. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. 463 U.,.S. 277 (1983).
110. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
111. Id.
112. Id. at Z'2-93.
113. Id. at 291.
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courts can compare other jurisdictions' sentencing practices for the
commission of the same crime. 114
The Court did not mandate an inquiry into each factor.115 However, no
one factor may be sufficient to determine the constitutionality of a parti-
cular sentence.116 Most importantly, when applying these objective factors,
the reviewing courts should give substantial deference to the state's
legislature and to the discretionary authority of trial court judges in
sentencing offenders. 117
In Solem, the defendant's life sentence for a seventh non-violent felony
was held unconstitutional."l 8 When applying the objective criteria, the
Court found that the defendant's sentence was the most severe for relatively
minor conduct.'" 9 He was treated more severely than other criminals within
the state that had committed crimes that were more serious. 120 With the
exception of one state, he was treated more harshly than any other
jurisdiction would have treated a similar offender.121 The Court concluded
that the defendant's sentence was significantly disproportionate to his
crime, therefore violating the Eighth Amendment. 122
114. Id.
115. Id. at 290 n.17.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 290. More recently the Court has reasoned that due to the high rate of recidivism
and the diversity of approaches dealing with recidivism, the Court will tolerate a spectrum of state
procedures dealing with it. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992) (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554, 566 (1967)). The Court upheld the defendant's sentence under the Kentucky statute that
enhanced sentences for repeat felons. Id. at 34.
118. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). Helm had been convicted of six non-violent
felonies in South Dakota prior to his life sentence. Id. at 279. His prior crimes consisted of three
convictions of third-degree burglary, obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and
driving while intoxicated. Id. at 279-80.
119. Id. at 297. In Solem, the defendant's seventh felony conviction was for writing a "no
account" $100 check. Id. at 281. The law in South Dakota states that,
"[A ny person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another for present
consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial institution
knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account
with such financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony."
Id. at 281 n.5 (quoting S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-41-1.2 (1979)).
120. Id. at 299.
121. Id. Nevada is the only state that would have authorized a life sentence without parole
for Helm's offense. Id. The Court noted that Nevada merely authorizes a life sentence; however,
it was not known to the Court whether a defendant had actually received this severe sentence for
Helm's crime. Id. at 300.
122. Id. at 303.
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b. Narrowing the Proportionality Principle
Eight years later, in Harmelin v. Michigan,123 Justice Kennedy pro-
vided insight on how broad the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment spans.124 He analyzed common ideas within pre-
vious decisions to support that the proportionality principle is very narrow
when applied to non-capital cases. 125 The first principle Justice Kennedy
argued was that sentencing guidelines should be left to the state
legislatures.126 Second, the Eighth Amendment does not require imple-
mentation of any specific penological theory. 127 Third, every jurisdiction
has a different rationale for adopting a specific penological theory;
therefore, there will be differences in sentencing between jurisdictions.1
28
Finally, proportionality should be reviewed by objective factors.129 Justice
Kennedy concluded that all these principles support the fact that "[t]he
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime
and sentence." 130  Rather, it prohibits only "grossly disproportionate"
sentences. 131
In Harmelin, the Court upheld the defendant's sentence of a mandatory
term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for possessing
more than 650 grams of cocaine. 132 Justice Kennedy, when weighing the
123. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
124. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Harnelin has been accepted as law by the Court. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311
(2002) (holding that executions of mentally retarded criminals is cruel and unusual punishment
when applying the proportionality principle to the Eighth Amendment). The majority of the
Harmelin opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia and was joined by the Chief Justice Rehnquist
for parts 1, 1I, III, which concluded that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
principle. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961. The judgment of the court was delivered by Justice Scalia
in part IV of the opinion. Id. The judgment was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Id. at 996. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion, concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter joined. Id.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence stated that the Eighth Amendment does contain a proportionality
principle. Id.
125. Id. at 997-98.
126. Id. at 998.
127. Id. at 999.
128. Id. Penology is "the study of penal institutions, crime prevention, and the punishment
and rehabilitation of criminals, including the art of fitting the right treatment to an offender."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (7th ed. 1999).
129. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (referring to the objective factors set forth in Solem).
The objective factors set forth in Solem consisted of, (1) weighing the gravity of the offense with
the harshness of the penalty, (2) comparing sentences imposed on other criminals within the same
jurisdiction -: the offender, and (3) comparing the sentences imposed on other criminals for
commission of the same crime within other jurisdictions. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92
(1983).
130. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1009.
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crime with the punishment, concluded that the defendant's sentence was the
second most severe penalty permitted by law; however, his crime
threatened to cause grave harm to society.133 Considering the severe nature
of the defendant's crime, his sentence did not give an inference of gross
disproportionality; therefore, no jurisdictional comparison was needed and
the sentence was held constitutional. 134
2. No Proportionality Implied in the Eighth Amendment
An opposing interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is that there is no
proportionality guarantee written into the amendment.135 Rather, the belief
is that the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments refers only to the
modes of punishment.136 This view has only been accepted by a few
Justices of the Court.137 The majority opinion in Harmelin sets forth four
reasons for concluding that there is no proportionality contained within the
Eighth Amendment. 138
First, the Solem Court noted that the Eighth Amendment was derived
from the English Declaration of Rights of 1689; however, Justice Scalia
argued that the guarantee used by the King's Bench was a protection from
illegal sentences rather than disproportional sentences. 139 Justice Scalia
produced examples where the King's Bench allowed for discretion of the
court as long as the sentence did not extend to life.140 Like the American
version, the English court had a "cruel and unusual" provision written into
the Declaration of Rights.141 The decisions that were handed down during
133. Id. at 1002.
134. Id. at 1004.
135. Id. at 965.
136. Id. at 974.
137. Id. at 965; Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 32
(Thomas, J., concurring).
138. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 957, 962-94 (1991).
139. Id. at 967 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983)).
140. Id. at 970.
141. Id. at 966 (citing 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2, (1689)). The preamble to the
Declaration of Rights contained almost identical language to the Eighth Amendment; the
document stated,
"By Prosecutions in the Court of Kings Bench for Matters and Causes cognizable
onely in Parlyament and by diverse other Arbitrary and Illegall Courses.... Excessive
Baile hath beene required of Persons committed in Criminall Cases to elude the
Benefit of the Lawes made for the Liberty of the Subjects .... And excessive Fines
have been imposed.... And illegall and cruell Punishments inflicted .... All which
are utterly and directly contrary to the knowne Lawes and Statutes and Freedome of
this Realme."
Id. at 969 (quoting 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689)).
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that time shed light on the interpretations of the phrase.142 The English
courts interpreted cruel as barbarous or illegal punishments.143 In England,
the courts also required that punishment not be unusual, meaning that the
sentence remain within the common-law traditions.'4 Therefore, it appears
unlikely that the English provision required the sentences to be
proportional. 145
Second, the Eighth Amendment intended to prohibit certain modes of
punishment that are not regularly or customarily used.146 Justice Scalia
noted that proportionality provisions had been included in several state
constitutions, therefore the framers were aware of such a concept. 147 If the
framers intended the Eighth Amendment to include proportionality, they
would have stated a proportionality principle directly.148 Scalia also used
nineteenth and early twentieth century cases to illustrate that, historically,
the concept of a sentence being proportional was only an issue in extreme
cases. 149
142. Id. at 969. The Court cited an example of the English court interpreting the "cruel and
unusual" provision. Id. at 969-71. The Court noted that in 1685, a clerk falsely accused fifteen
Catholics of conspiring to overthrow King Charles II. Id. at 969. The falsely accused men were
tried and executed. Id. at 969-70. The clerk was convicted of bearing false witness against an-
other. Id. at 970 (citing Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 How. St. Tr. 1227, 1314 (K. B. 1685)).
The English court agreed that the punishment would be decided by the discretion of the court, as
long as the sentence did not extend to life. Id. (quoting Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 How. St.
Tr. at 1316). The English court sentenced the clerk to whipping and life imprisonment. Id. The
dissenting judges of the English court concluded that "'... Said Judgments are barbarous,
inhuman, and unchristian; and there is no Precedent to warrant the Punishments of whipping and
committing to Prison for Life, for the Crime of Perjury; which yet were but Part of the
Punishments inflicted upon him"' and "' . . . that the said judgments were contrary to Law and
ancient Practice, and therefore, erroneous, and ought to be reversed."' Id. at 971 (quoting Second
Trial of Oates, 10 How. St. Tr. at 1325). The clerk sought to have his sentence annulled by the
House of Commons, but was unsuccessful. Id. The House of Commons had stated that the "cruel
and unusual" provision focused on illegality, not proportionality. Id.
143. Id. at 971.
144. Id. at 974. The majority noted that the common-law traditions allowed a death penalty
for all felonies until 1826. Id. at 975 (citing 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 458, 471-72 (1883)). By 1830, the law allowed the death penalty for murder, attempted
murder, administering poison to procure abortion, sodomy, rape, statutory rape, and certain classes
of forgery. Id. (citing I J. STEPHEN at 473-74).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 976.
147. See id. at 977 (listing states that had included proportionality protections in their
constitutions).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 984-85. The Court cited a past decision finding that a sentence is disproportional
to an offense when it will "'shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people
[would be] cruel and unusual."' Id. at 985 (quoting Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473, 488 (9th
Cir. 1900)).
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Third, there are no textual or historical standards to assist judges in
determining disproportionality.150 The lack of standards is due to the
changing needs of the legislature.1S' Proportionality of a sentence is depen-
dent on the current needs of the state.152  As a result, there can be
differences between jurisdictions because federalism allows states to treat
similar situations differently due to local needs, concerns, and social
conditions. 153
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that one of the earliest proportionality
cases held a sentence unconstitutional because the punishment was unusual,
not because the sentence was disproportional. 154 He argued that the defen-
dant's sentence was unknown to Anglo-American tradition, which made the
punishment unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. 5 5 Sentences for a
term-of-years that are severe and mandatory might be cruel, but they are not
unusual.I56 These sentences have been used throughout this country's his-
tory and are not "unusual" under the proportionality principle set forth by
earlier cases. 157
D. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are four theories of punishment within the criminal justice
system: deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation. 5 8 State
legislatures are responsible for making the policy decisions of what theories
support the state's sentencing scheme.159 California sought to increase
public safety by deterring and incapacitating repeat offenders. 160 The state
legislature enacted "Three Strikes You're Out," which sentenced repeat
150. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985 (1991).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 990.
154. Id. at 990-91. In Weems v. United States, the defendant was convicted of falsifying a
public document. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 360 (1910). He was sentenced to
cadena temporal, which consisted of the defendant having to carry chains around his wrists and
ankles for the rest of his life, employed at hard and painful labor, fifteen years imprisonment, civil
interdiction, surveillance during life, and perpetual absolute disqualification from activities in-
cluding the loss of the right to vote, acquire honors, and retirement pay. Id. at 364. The Court
held the prisoner's sentence was disproportional and cruel and unusual punishment, therefore
unconstitutional. Id. at 381.
155. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 991.
156. Id. at 994-95
157. Id.
158. Id. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 129 (Cal. 1968).
160. People v. Leng, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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offenders to increased mandatory prison sentences. 161 However, the law
brought a constitutional question to the Court: whether the three strikes law
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. 162
In previous cases, the Court has implied a proportionality principle
within the Eighth Amendment,163 but has not been consistent.1 64  In
Rummel, the Court held a mandatory life sentence was not cruel and
unusual punishment since the sentence was not "grossly disproportionate"
to the crime. 165 In Solem, while finding a defendant's sentence uncon-
stitutional, the Court arrived at an objective framework in determining
proportionality.166 The objective criteria consisted of weighing the offense
against the penalty and comparing sentences of offenders within the same
jurisdiction and within other jurisdictions.167 Eight years later in Harmelin,
the Court upheld a defendant's life sentence using the framework.168
However, the Court disagreed on whether the Eighth Amendment contained
a proportionality principle for non-capital sentences. 169
III. ANALYSIS
In Ewing v. California,170 Justice O'Connor delivered the majority
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined.171
The majority held that Ewing's sentence of twenty-five years to life for a
repeat felony conviction was not grossly disproportionate, and therefore it
did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 72 Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions.173 Justice Stevens wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.174
161. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 2004).
162. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003).
163. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,284 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980).
164. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97.
165. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 271-72, 285.
166. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-95.
167. Id. at 290-92.
168. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 996.
170. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
171. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14.
172. Id. at 29-30.
173. Id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., separately concurring).
174. Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg joined. 175
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Court's precedent on interpreting the Eighth Amendment has not
been clear and well-accepted.176 The Court interpreted the Eighth Amend-
ment to contain a narrow proportionality principle when applying to non-
capital sentences. 177 The Court also gave great deference to state legisla-
tures in selecting sentencing guidelines.178 In evaluating Ewing's claim, the
Court weighed the gravity of his offense against the harshness of the
penalty to determine if the sentence was "grossly disproportionate."1 79 The
Court concluded that Ewing's twenty-five years to life sentence was not
"grossly disproportionate" and did not violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.'80
1. The Court Interprets a Narrow Proportionality Principle
Contained in the Eighth Amendment
The Court relied on prior decisions to conclude that the Eighth
Amendment contained a narrow proportionality principle when applied to
non-capital sentences. 181 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does
not contain a strict proportionality requirement between the crime and the
sentence; the Court only forbade those sentences that were "grossly
disproportionate" to the crime. 182
The Court stated that successful challenges to the proportionality
principle to the Eighth Amendment would be exceedingly rare for non-
capital sentences. 183 As in Rummel, the Court found that the proportionality
principle would only be applied "'in the extreme example, ... if a legisla-
ture made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.'"1 84
The Court applied the framework, set forth by Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Harmelin, to review the proportionality of an
175. Id. at 35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 20 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 12.
180. Id. at 30-31.
181. Id. at 20; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97 (holding the defendant's sentence
constitutional because the sentence was not significantly disproportional to the crimes committed).
182. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001).
183. Id. at 22 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
184. Id. at 21 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n. 11).
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offender's sentence. 185 These principles consisted of "the primacy of the
legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our
federal system, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided
by objective factors."186 The Court, persuaded by Justice Kennedy's con-
currence in Harmelin, concluded that the Eighth Amendment has a narrow
proportionality principle that applies to non-capital cases. 187
2. The Court Defers to California's Legislature
The Court noted that states, like California, have made a deliberate
policy choice by implementing recidivist legislation to address public safety
concerns. 188 The Court found that the greatest threat to public safety ap-
pears to be career criminals, individuals who are not deterred by con-
ventional approaches to punishment and who have repeatedly engaged in
"serious or violent" criminal behavior.189 The Court concluded that the
individual states should be left to drafting and implementing these policy
decisions. 190
The Court stated that our Constitution "'does not mandate adoption of
any one penological theory."191 The Court stated that a state can adopt any
of the theories of punishment, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribu-
tion, or rehabilitation.192 It found that selecting and designing a sentencing
scheme has been left for the legislatures, not federal courts. 193
The Court noted that California implemented three strikes legislation in
order to increase public safety.194 The Court focused on the legislature's
decision to increase public safety by incapacitating all repeat felons.195 It
stated there was nothing in the Eighth Amendment that prohibited
California from making such a policy decision. 96 In fact, the Court noted
"'states have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual
criminals."1 97
185. Id. at 23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001).
186. Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001).
187. Id. at 20 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97).
188. Id. at 24.
189. Id.
190. Id.






197. Id. at 25 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992)).
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The Court found that incapacitating repeat offenders has been a
legitimate basis for reducing rising recidivism rates. 198 It cited a report that
stated sixty-seven percent of former inmates released from state prisons
were charged with at least one serious new crime within three years of their
release.199 The Court determined that California was no different. 200 It
noted that a study conducted in 1996 revealed that 233 three-strike
offenders in California had a combined 1,165 prior felony convictions, an
average of five convictions apiece, which consisted of 322 robberies and
262 burglaries.201
The Court determined that deterring crime was also a legitimate basis
for recidivist statutes. 202 It agreed with the reasoning in Rummel, that the
primary goals for recidivist statutes were to "'deter repeat offenders and, at
some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses
serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from the
rest of society for an extended period of time."' 203 The Court found that
within California there had been a drop in the recidivism rate of parolees,
illustrating that the law has a deterrent effect.204 It noted that the recidivism
rate had dropped by twenty-five percent since the passage of California's
three strikes law.205 Another important effect the Court based its holding on
was parolees leaving the state. 206 Out of fear of getting a second or third
strike, the Court stated that more California parolees were leaving the state
than parolees from other states entering California.207  The Court
198. Id. at 25-26. The Court noted that previous double jeopardy challenges have been
rejected because the stiffened penalty is given for the latest crime but enhanced due to the
criminal's repetition of criminal activity. Id. (quoting Grygor v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732
(1948)).
199. Id. (citing P. LANGAN & D. LEVIN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT:
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (June 2002)).
200. Id. at 26.
201. Id. (citing Andy Furillo, Three Strikes-The Verdict's In: Most Offenders have Long
Criminal Histories, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31, 1996, at Al).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 27 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980)).
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GEN., CAL. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, "THREE STRIKES
AND YOU'RE OUT"-ITS IMPACT ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFTER FOUR
YEARS, 10 (1998)).
206. Id. (citing OFFICE OF THE A-TORNEY GEN., CAL. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, THREE STRIKES
AND YOU'RE OUT"- ITS IMPACT ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFTER FOUR
YEARS, 10 (1998)).
207. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GEN., CAL. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, THREE STRIKES
AND YOU'RE OUT" - ITS IMPACT ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFTER FOUR
YEARS, 10 (1998)).
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determined that it was the first time more parolees left the state than entered
since 1976.208
Based on the statute's effect in California, the Court reasoned that the
legislature had a reasonable basis for believing the three strikes law ad-
vanced the goals of its criminal justice system. 209 The Court stated it would
"not sit as a 'super legislature' to second-guess these policy choices." 210
3. The Court Determines "Grossly Disproportionate"
After the Court determined that the Eighth Amendment contained a
narrow proportionality principle and that the three strikes law furthered
California's legitimate interests, the Court turned to Ewing's sentence to
determine if it was "grossly disproportional." 211 In order to determine
whether Ewing's sentence was grossly disproportionate, the Court weighed
the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty.212
The Court noted that Ewing's crime, grand theft, was a serious crime
that was a felony under federal law and under most state law. 213 Under
California law, the crime would be classified as a "wobbler."214 The Court
determined that felony grand theft could be reduced to a misdemeanor by
the discretion of the courts; however, it remains a felony unless the court
decides otherwise. 215 The Court noted that the purpose of the court's
discretion of reducing felonies was to impose a misdemeanor sentence in
cases where incarceration would obstruct a defendant's rehabilitation
process. 216 The Court determined that the trial court properly exercised
discretion in refusing to reduce Ewing's felony conviction down to a
misdemeanor due to the number and severity of his previous convictions. 217
By weighing the gravity of Ewing's offense, the Court not only
analyzed Ewing's current felony conviction, but also took into considera-
tion his previous felony convictions. 218 The Court noted that weighing
208. Id.




213. Id. The Court noted that under federal law, theft of $1,200 in property is a felony under
18 U.S.C. § 641 (2004). Id. Also, the Supreme Court of California has viewed grand theft as a
"serious" crime when reviewing proportionality of sentences. Id. (citing In re Lynch, 503 P.2d
921,936 n.20 (Cal. 1972)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 28-29 (citing In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 126 (Cal. 1968) (Tobriner, J.,
concurring)).
216. Id. (quoting Anderson, 447 P.2d at 152).
217. Id. at 29-30.
218. Id.
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Ewing's previous convictions was required in order to defer to California's
goal of penalizing repeat offenders who cannot conform to the norms of
society.219 The Court reasoned that if the Court ignored Ewing's prior con-
victions, the Court would be ignoring California's interest in incapacitating
and deterring habitual felons.220
Due to Ewing's habitual criminality, the Court determined that his
sentence was justified by California's interest in public safety through
incapacitating and deterring repeat felons. 221 The Court took into con-
sideration Ewing's numerous convictions, his nine prison terms, that he
committed his crimes while on probation or parole, and that his prior strikes
were serious felonies. 222 These considerations supported the Court's con-
clusion that Ewing's twenty-five year sentence was not "grossly dispro-
portionate." 223 The Court concluded that Ewing's sentence was not "'the
rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of 'gross disproportionality."' 224
The Court held that since Ewing's sentence of twenty-five years to life for
felony grand theft was not "grossly disproportionate," his sentence did not
violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments. 225
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion stated the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited only certain modes of punishment and does not contain a propor-
tionality principle. 226 He stated that he would be willing to accept the
holding of Solem, out of respect for the principle of stare decisis. 227
However, he argued that he could not accept the holding because it could
not be intelligently applied to Ewing's case. 228





224. Id. at 30 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)). Because Ewing's sentence did not pass the threshold test, the Court did not continue
within the objective framework by performing the jurisdictional analysis. Id.; see also Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 n.17 (1983) (noting no single factor may be sufficient in determining
whether a sentence is disproportionate).
225. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31(2003).
226. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring).




Justice Scalia reasoned that the Constitution does not require adopting
any one penological theory. 229 He noted that sentencing structures could
have different justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution,
or rehabilitation. 23
0
Justice Scalia tested the majority's two step process of first, weighing
the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty, then deter-
mining if Ewing's sentence justified California's interests of incapacitating
and deterring repeat felons.231 Justice Scalia argued that the first part of the
inquiry, in determining the proportionality of Ewing's twenty-five years to
life sentence for stealing three golf clubs, was not convincingly established
by the Court.232 He reasoned that this would lead the majority opinion to
read that the sentence should reasonably reflect the goals and purposes of
the state, not that the punishment should be proportional to the offense.
233
He concluded that evaluating the goals and purposes would be evaluating
the state's policy instead of applying law.
2 34
C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas reasoned that the proportionality test in Solem could
not be applied because the test lacks clarity. 235 However, even if the test in
Solem was clear, he stated he would not be compelled by stare decisis to
apply it.236 He reasoned that he would not apply the test because the Eighth
Amendment does not contain a proportionality principle.2 37 However,
Justice Thomas followed the majority's conclusion that Ewing's sentence
did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments. 238
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens argued that the Eighth Amendment contained a narrow
proportionality principle and that Ewing's sentence was not "grossly dispro-
portionate." 239 He argued that case law allowed for judges to have
229. Id.
230. Id. at 31-32.




235. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
236. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983)).
237. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,967-85 (1991)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 32-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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discretion to determine the proportionality of fines 240 and capital sen-
tences. 24 1 Justice Stevens concluded that sentences, for a term of years, fell
in between fines and capital sentences and were protected under the Eighth
Amendment.242
Justice Stevens' dissent argued that the absence of a "black letter rule"
does not disable judges from using their discretion in interpreting the limits
of the Eighth Amendment.243 Justice Stevens argued that the Court has
used its discretion in other parts of the Constitution.2 44 He cited as an
example that "the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
right to a speedy trial;" the courts must determine through their discretion
whether a particular delay is constitutionally permissible.245
Justice Stevens stressed that history has shown that before sentencing
guidelines were employed, judges were given the authority to sentence
defendants within a broad range. 246 He noted sentencing judges would take
into account justifications of the punishment, for example, incapacitation,
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.2 47 Justice Stevens interpreted the
Eighth Amendment to include a "broad and basic proportionality principle"
that took into consideration all sentencing justifications. 248 He reasoned
that the "broad and basic proportionality principle" prevented states from
justifying "a life sentence for overtime parking." 249
E. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority opinion.2 50 He reasoned that
under the framework set forth by Solem, Ewing's punishment was "grossly
disproportionate."251 Justice Breyer argued that Ewing's sentence passed
the first step, the threshold test, finding that the punishment outweighed the
crime.252 In the second part of the test, an intra-jurisdictional analysis,
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's sentence was "unique" when
240. Id. at 33 (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1998)).
241. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 33. Blackletter law refers to "[olne or more legal principles that are old,
fundamental, and well settled." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 163 (7th ed. 1999).
244. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 34 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 648 (1992)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 35.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 35-37 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983)).
252. Id. at 37.
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compared to other sentences in California. 253 He concluded that the third
part of the test, an inter-jurisdictional analysis, had the same result when
compared with other jurisdictions.
254
1. Threshold Comparison of the Crime
First, Justice Breyer reasoned that Ewing's sentence was dispro-
portional by applying precedent. 255 He focused on Rummel and Solem to
show where on the spectrum Ewing's sentence fell. 256 Justice Breyer ar-
gued that Ewing's sentence fell in between Rummel's constitutional
sentence 257 and Solem's unconstitutional sentence.
258
In weighing the gravity of the offense with the severity of the
punishment in these cases, Justice Breyer determined that courts have
looked at sentence-related characteristics, such as the length of time the
offender is likely to spend in prison, the sentence triggering conduct, and
the offender's criminal history.259  He concluded that the difference
between holding Rummel's claim constitutional and Solem's claim
unconstitutional was the difference in the length of the real prison term.
260
He noted that Rummel's term amounted to ten to twelve years, whereas
Solem would have spent the rest of his life in prison. 261 Justice Breyer
concluded that Ewing's sentence, once again, lies in between these two
cases. 262 Ewing must spend at least twenty-five years in prison. 263 Justice
Breyer argued this comparison raised questions of unconstitutionality.
264
Second, Justice Breyer argued that Ewing's sentence imposed one of
the most severe punishments for one of the less serious forms of criminal
conduct. 265 He reasoned that a crime committed by a recidivist is serious;
however, courts have stated that the sentence must be for the triggering
offense, with the prior offenses being relevant.266 Justice Breyer concluded
253. Id. at 47.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 35-37.
256. Id. at 37 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265-66, 269, 276, 278, 280-81
(1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-303 (1983)).
257. id. at 38 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265).
258. Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 303).
259. Id. (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66, 269, 276, 278, 280-8 1).
260. Id. at 38.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 39.
264. Id. at 40.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 41 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 n.21 (1983)).
2004]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
that Ewing's sentence was one of the most severe for a lower ranking
offense. 26
7
Third, Justice Breyer argued judges in other jurisdictions would find
Ewing's sentence "disproportionately harsh." 268 Justice Breyer noted that
the United States Sentencing Commission does not even include theft re-
lated offenses with the crimes that would receive especially long sentences
for recidivists. 269
Justice Breyer determined that the three factors discussed above
strongly supported Ewing's argument that his sentence was "grossly dis-
proportionate;" therefore, his claim passed the threshold test.270 Since
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's sentence passed the threshold test,
Justice Breyer proceeded within the Solem framework by comparing
Ewing's sentence with California and other jurisdictions. 271
2. Intra-Jurisdictional Comparison
Justice Breyer reasoned that an intra-jurisdictional comparative
analysis would answer the question of how other offenders within Cali-
fornia would be sentenced for the same offense without the three strikes
law.272 Another question that he reasoned would be answered under this
analysis was what conduct would cause California to impose the same
prison term.273  However, Justice Breyer noted that sentencing statutes
usually do not reflect the actual time served.274
First, Justice Breyer reasoned that before 1994, when the three strikes
law was enacted, no one like Ewing could have served over ten years in
267. Id. In order to determine the gravity of the offense, Justice Breyer applied the test used
in Solem by looking at the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, the absolute
magnitude of the crime, and the offender's culpability. Id. at 40 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-
93). Justice Breyer concluded, after considering all three criteria, Ewing's sentence "ranks well
toward the bottom of the criminal conduct scale." Id.
268. Id. at41.
269. Id. (citing United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B.LI, 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 4B.LI
(2002)).
270. Id. at 42. Justice Breyer stated that arguably unconstitutional sentences, not only ac-
tually unconstitutional sentences, must pass the threshold test. Id. He argued that if only actually
unconstitutional sentences passed, then the test would be a determinative test, not a threshold test.
Id. A determinative test would not take into account comparisons with other sentences. Id. He
reasoned that sentencing comparisons are important because they provide objective content in
determining proportionality. Id. Justice Breyer noted that in Harmelin, the Court stated that pro-
portionality should only be reviewed by objective factors. See id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1000, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
271. Id. at 42-43 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. Justice Breyer stated due to good-time credits, parole, and broad discretion given to
judges in sentencing, offenders usually do not serve the statutory maximum for the crime. Id.
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prison since California's habitual offender laws did not apply to grand
theft. 275 He then reasoned that statistics showed that recidivists convicted
during that same time in California served only a fraction of Ewing's real
time sentence. 276 Finally, Breyer concluded that Ewing's sentence, at least
twenty-five real years in prison, should be reserved for criminals convicted
of crimes far worse than Ewing's.
277
3. Inter-Jurisdictional Comparison
Justice Breyer determined that the next step required the comparative
analysis with other jurisdictions.278 He noted that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines would sentence a recidivist, like Ewing, to eighteen months in
prison. 279 He also noted that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would only
impose Ewing's sentence on a recidivist whose current offense is murder,
280
robbery, 281 or aggravated theft of more than $100 million.
282
Justice Breyer determined that thirty-three jurisdictions' laws would
make it impossible to sentence Ewing to more than ten years in prison.
283
He determined that in four other states, Ewing could not have received a
sentence of more than fifteen years. 284 In addition, he noted four states
could not have sentenced Ewing to more than twenty years in prison.
285
Justice Breyer used these statistics to illustrate that Ewing's sentence was
rare. 286 He concluded that the length of time Ewing would have to spend in
prison exceeded the time most jurisdictions would incarcerate offenders
with similar convictions.
287
275. Id. at 43-44.
276. Id. at 44.
277. Id. California reserved the same sentence for Ewing's theft as for a nonrecidivist, first-
degree murderer. Id.
278. Id. at 45.
279. Id. (citing United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1(a), 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2B1.l(a)
(1999)).
280. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2A1.2).
281. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2B3.1 (stating robbery involving the discharge of a
firearm, serious bodily injury, and an amount about one million dollars)).
282. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2B1.l).
283. Id. at app. 46. These jurisdictions included Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. app. at 53-57.
284. Id. app. at 46. These states included Colorado, Maryland, New Hampshire, and
Wisconsin. Id. app. at 57-58.
285. id. These states included Arkansas, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia. Id. app. at 58-59.
286. Id. at 45-47.
287. Id. at 46.
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However, Justice Breyer determined that nine other states make it
legally possible to impose a sentence of twenty-five years or more for
Ewing's offenses.288 He noted that five of those nine states would allow the
offender eligibility for parole before twenty-five years.289
After comparing the sentencing guidelines of other jurisdictions,
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's sentence, outside California's three
strikes law, was "virtually unique in its harshness for his offense of
conviction and by a considerable degree." 290
4. Examining Policy Considerations
Justice Breyer noted that the last part of the framework required an
examination of Ewing's sentence by determining if the law justifies
California's policy concerns. 291  However, Justice Breyer argued that
Ewing's sentence does not further any criminal justice objective. 292
Justice Breyer argued that the statute did not effectively separate
triggering offenses from non-triggering offenses.293 He reasoned that the
statute clearly delineated felonies as triggering offenses; however, the class-
ification was based on the characteristics of the offender, not the specific
offense.294 Justice Breyer concluded that their sort of classification pro-
duced inconsistencies within the three strikes law.295
Justice Breyer argued that the first inconsistency concerned the
seriousness of the triggering offense.296 He noted that the "wobbler" stat-
utes included many levels of offenses.297 The seriousness of the offenses
ranged from assault with a deadly weapon to stealing more than $100 worth
of chickens, nuts, or avocados.298 The second inconsistency concerned the
temporal order of the offenses.299 Justice Breyer determined that if an of-
fender whose first crime was a "wobbler" and then graduated to more
serious crimes, the offender's sentence would not fall under the three strikes
288. Id. These states included Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. app. at 59-62.
289. Id. app. at 59 n.2. These states included Alabama, Montana, Nevada, Vermont, and
West Virginia. Id. app. at 59-62.
290. Id. at 47.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 47-48.
293. Id. at 48.





299. Id. at 50.
[VOL. 80:497
CASE COMMENT
law.300 Justice Breyer argued that the reason for this inconsistency is that
the "wobbler" will most likely be reduced down to a misdemeanor because
it was the offender's first offense.30' However, Justice Breyer reasoned that
a similar offender would fall under the three strikes law if the "wobbler"
was the offender's third offense, since the "wobbler" will most likely be
treated as a felony. 302 The third inconsistency Justice Breyer noted con-
cerned the offender's criminal record. 303 This occurs when an offender's
crime is elevated based on the offender's previous crimes.304 Justice Breyer
cited an example of a petty theft, a misdemeanor. 305 However, he noted
that an offender's second conviction of petty theft is a felony and therefore
a triggering offense. 306 As a result, an offender with two prior violent
felonies and the third offense is petty theft, will not fall under the three
strikes law since the criminal history does not have any similar property
crimes. 307 However, Justice Breyer stated that an offender who has
committed one violent crime, one petty theft, and the third offense was
another petty theft, would fall under the three strikes law.
308
Due to these inconsistencies within the three strikes law, Justice Breyer
recommended that the California Legislature enumerate the triggering
offenses.309 By enumerating the triggering offenses, he reasoned that Cali-
fornia would eliminate the seriously disproportional sentences that were
being handed down. 310 Justice Breyer noted that California's statute was
passed in order to reduce "serious and violent" crime, which includes
crimes against the person, physical crimes, and drug crimes. 311 He con-











309. Id. at 51.
310. Id. at 52-53.
311. Id. at 51.
312. Id.
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IV. IMPACT
A. EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
The Court's previous opinions have been unclear as to what constitutes
"gross disproportionality." 313  However, the Supreme Court's decision in
Ewing clarified the test for non-capital sentences. 314 As a result, propor-
tionality will be narrowly applied to non-capital cases, and "gross
disproportionality" will only be used for the extraordinary case. 315 Despite
the Court's five to four decision, and even though the members of the Court
could not agree on how to treat Ewing's sentence, it would be extremely
difficult to successfully challenge any punishment as "grossly dispro-
portionate." 316 In Lockyer v. Andrade,317 the Court made challenges even
more difficult by narrowing the federal court's ability to grant habeas
corpus relief to state prisoners. 318 As a result, the decisions in Ewing and
Lockyer will have an impact beyond California. 319
In California, the appellate courts have affirmed a number of three
strikes sentences. 320 In People v. Pabriaga,321 the court held that the defen-
dant's twenty-six year sentence under California's three strikes law did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. 322 The defendant was convicted of being a
violent felon in possession of a firearm.323 Two prior felony convictions,
313. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
314. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (weighing the seriousness of Ewing's
current and prior offenses compared to the harshness of the penalty while taking into consi-
deration the state's interests).
315. Id. at 29-30.
316. Erwin Chemernsky, Is Any Sentence Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 39 TRIAL 78, 78
(May 2003).
317. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
318. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75.
319. Id. at 76.
320. See People v. Pabriaga, No. A098633, 2003 WL 22222209, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
26, 2003) (upholding the defendant's twenty-six year sentence for possession of a firearm, under
California's three strikes law); see also People v. Jackson, No. C040556, 2003 WL 21791251, at
*5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2003) (upholding defendant's sentence of twenty-five years for
possession of marijuana, under California's three strikes law); People v. Brown, No. B157865,
2003 WL 21733529, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2003) (upholding defendant's sentence of
twenty-five years to life plus six years for burglary and assault, under California's three strikes
law); People v. Hurtado, No. E032306, 2003 WL 21480994, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2003)
(upholding defendant's sentence of fifty years for vehicle theft and receiving stolen property,
under California's three strikes law); People v. Atkerson, No. F040626, 2003 WL 22183935, at * 1
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003) (upholding defendant's sentence of twenty-five years for battery,
under California's three strikes law).
321. No. A098633, 2003 WL 22222209, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2003).
322. Pabriaga, 2003 WL 22222209, at * 1.
323. Id. The defendant had also been charged with murder; however, the jury was unable to
reach a verdict on this count. Id.
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forcible rape, and oral copulation by force, triggered the three strikes law. 324
The court relied on the recent decision in Ewing to uphold the defendant's
sentence. 325 The court applied the objective framework used in Ewing,
weighing the gravity of the offense with the punishment. 326 The court noted
that the defendant had committed a violent felony, unlike Ewing whose
current conviction was a "wobbler."327 The court concluded that the
defendant posed a serious threat to society by carrying a loaded weapon on
a public street while he was still on parole. 328 The court also considered the
defendant's recidivism when determining the harshness of the penalty.329
The court found that the gravity of the defendant's current conviction,
combined with his prior offenses, was proportionate to his sentence. 330 The
court concluded that the defendant's sentence was not one of the rare
situations in which a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violated
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.331
In contrast, a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware
held a defendant's sentence unconstitutional. 332 In Crosby v. State,333 the
court held that the defendant's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. 334 Crosby was a habitual
criminal who had committed five prior felonies, which included two bur-
glaries, forgery, possession of a deadly weapon, and possession with intent
to deliver. 335 Crosby was sentenced to forty-five years under Delaware's
habitual offender statute for his sixth felony, forgery. 336 Delaware's statute
authorized trial courts to sentence any person who had been convicted of
324. Id.
325. Id. at *2.
326. Id. at *3.
327. Id.
328. Id. The court noted that the State of California considers the defendant's crime to be a
grave offense." Id.
329. Id. The court noted that the defendant's two prior felonies involved violence or threats
of violence. Id. In these attacks, he had used a baseball bat as a deadly weapon. Id. The court
reasoned that since his release in 1998, he has continued to commit crimes. Id. He absconded
from his parole in 1999 and committed his current offense in 2000. Id.
330. Id. at *4. Since the defendant's sentence was proportional, the court found it unneces-
sary to perform the intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons. Id. (citing Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005-07 (1991)).
331. Id.
332. Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894, 913 (Del. 2003).
333. 824 A.2d 894 (2003).
334. Crosby, 824 A.2d at 913.
335. Id. at 896-97.
336. Id. at 897.
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three felonies and committed a fourth felony to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.
337
Despite the United States Supreme Court's holding in Ewing, the
Supreme Court of Delaware found Crosby's sentence to be "grossly dispro-
portional." 338 The court concluded Crosby was the rare case where a defen-
dant was convicted of a non-violent felony, and his criminal record did not
involve repeated violent crimes, but was sentenced to a life term. 339 The
court compared Crosby's sentence to Ewing's, holding that Ewing's sen-
tence imposed far less prison time.340 Ewing's triggering crime was more
serious than Crosby's, and Ewing's prior criminal history was more serious
than Crosby's. 341 The court noted that Crosby's combination of factors
were unprecedented, which led to the court's conclusion that Crosby's
sentence was "grossly disproportional." 342
With California's three strikes law passing constitutional scrutiny, the
prison populations are likely to increase since offenders will be serving
longer sentences. 343 The law has been criticized for its slight decrease in
criminal activity and its large increase in prison population. 344 According
to the California Department of Corrections, the average yearly cost to
house an inmate is $28,502. 345 Recidivist legislation, like the three strikes
law, has become tremendously expensive for states to maintain. 346 The
337. Id. at 907. Section 3911 of the Delaware statute reads,
"Any person who has been three times convicted of a felony, other than those which
are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) hereunder, under the laws of this State,
and/or any other State, United States or any territory of the United States, and who
shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be a
habitual criminal, and the Court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had,
in imposing sentence, may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so
convicted."
Id. at 898 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 3911 (1974) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4214 (2004))).
338. Id. at 912.
339. Id. at 913.
340. Id. at 910.
341. Id. at 910-11.
342. Id. at 913.
343. See Reyes v. Woodford, No. 00-57130, 2003 WL 23095939, at * 1 (9th Cir. Sept. 26,
2003) (affirming the defendant's twenty-six year sentence for perjury under the three strikes law).
The dissent in Reyes noted that the defendant would have been sentenced to a maximum of eight
years without the three strikes law being triggered. Id. at n.1 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
344. Dubber, supra note 41, at 222.
345. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR., FACTS AND FIGURES, at http://www.corr.ca.gov (2003) (last
visited Sept. 19, 2004).
346. Adam A. Liptak, Ideas & Trends: Crime and Punishment; Sentences are Too Long or
Too Short. Rarely, Just Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, § 4, at 3.
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result has caused states to relax their sentencing laws due to decreased
budgets. 34
7
However, tougher sentences can lead to lower crime rates for states. 348
Professor Levitt, an economist from the University of Chicago, has posited
that there is overwhelming evidence that mandatory minimums and three
strikes laws have the effect of reducing crime.349 Professor Levitt's study
suggests that three strikes laws may be a cost-effective approach to fighting
crime because the small number of criminals that commit a large number of
crimes are off the streets. 350 Critics of three strikes legislation warn that
such a sentencing system, by focusing on the wrong class of offenders,
violates society's fundamental sense of justice and unreasonably burdens
the public resources.351
B. APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA
The Court's opinion in Ewing will affect how judges in North Dakota
sentence defendants.352 The legislature in North Dakota can be assured that
the current habitual offender statute and newly enacted sentencing statutes
will not violate the Eighth Amendment unless the laws produce "grossly
disproportionate" sentences. 353
A defendant sentenced under North Dakota's habitual offender statute
challenged its constitutionality. 354 The Supreme Court of North Dakota
held that the statute did not violate the state or federal constitutions. 355
Although the court only addressed the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, under Ewing the statute would pass the constitutionality require-
ments under the Eighth Amendment. 356 The court recognized the state's
347. Id. The author noted that states, including Kansas, Texas, and Washington, have eased
their sentencing laws in the past year. Id. In response to rising incarceration costs, Michigan has
eliminated mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. Id. Other states, including Kansas
and California, have passed laws requiring drug treatment rather than prison sentences for




351. Nicholas N. Kittrie & Mark H. Allenbaugh, Jean Valjean Lives: Petty Criminals Face
Harsh Future after Three-Strikes Cases, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at 60.
352. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (2003 Supp.) (setting forth North
Dakota's sentencing scheme for habitual offenders).
353. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (stating an offender's sentence is
cruel and unusual punishment only if the sentence is "grossly disproportionate").
354. State v. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1977).
355. Id. at 300-01.
356. Id. at 299-301; see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-25 (deferring to the states' interest in
punishing and incapacitating repeat offenders).
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interest of providing lengthy sentences for particular offenders in order to
protect the public from further criminal conduct.
357
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Ewing clarified that there is a
narrow proportionality principle contained within the Eighth Amendment,
the North Dakota habitual offender statute needs no revisions.3 58 The North
Dakota habitual offender statute increases sentences for offenders who have
committed two felonies at different times.3 59 As long as the offender's sen-
tence is not the rare case that leads to an inference of "gross dispropor-




In Ewing, the Court ruled that Ewing's sentence of twenty-five years to
life for felony grand theft, under California's three strikes law, was not
"grossly disproportionate." 361 Therefore, Ewing's sentence did not violate
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
362
The Court interpreted a narrow proportionality principle contained within
the Eighth Amendment when applied to non-capital sentences, like
Ewing's. 363 Due to Ewing's lengthy and serious criminal record, the Court
determined his sentence was justified by California's public safety interest
of incapacitating and deterring habitual felons.3 64 In another attempt to
clarify whether a particular sentence for a term of years can violate the
Eighth Amendment, the Court still has "not established a clear or consistent
357. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d at 299.
358. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (2003 Supp.) (setting forth North
Dakota's sentencing scheme for habitual offenders).
359. Id. The North Dakota habitual offender statute states,
A court may sentence a convicted offender to an extended sentence as a dangerous
special offender or a habitual offender in accordance with this section upon a finding
of... [tihe convicted offender is a habitual offender. The court may not make such a
finding unless the offender is an adult and has previously been convicted in any state
or states or by the United States of two felonies of class C or above committed at
different times when the offender was an adult. For the purposes of this subdivision, a
felony conviction in another state or under the laws of the United States is considered
a felony of class C or above if it is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of
five years or more.
Id. § 12.1-32-09(1)(c). The statute states that an extended sentence of life imprisonment may be
imposed for offenders convicted of a class A felony, twenty years for a class B felony, and ten
years for a class C felony. Id. § 12.1-32-09(2)(a)-(c).
360. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 30-31.
363. Id. at 20 (quoting Hamelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97).
364. Id. at 29.
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path for courts to follow."365 However, under the particular facts set forth
in Ewing, the Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit California
from sentencing a repeat felon to twenty-five years to life for theft under the
state's three strikes law.366
Sarah Maureen Reed*
365. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (citing Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18-26).
366. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31.
* I wish to thank Greg for his love, support, and understanding during the writing of this
comment. I also wish to thank my family for their love and encouragement.
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